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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL

POWER. By Martin H. Redish.* New York, New York: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1980. Pp. xiii, 349, $24.00.

Robert A. Sedler**
This review of Professor Redish's excellent book is written from
the perspective of a "related fields" observer. I teach courses in Consti-

tutional Law and Conflict of Laws, but do not teach Federal Jurisdiction.' I have also had substantial involvement as an attorney in
constitutional litigation in the federal courts.2 Like Professor Redish, I
am concerned about the "tensions in the allocation of judicial power"

that may exist in our federal system, and like Professor Redish, I believe that "the integrity of the Article III federal courts as the primary

adjudicators of federal law must be preserved." 3 However, because I
am approaching the question from a "related fields" perspective, I am
perhaps less likely to see "tensions" arising from the way that judicial
power is allocated in our federal system.
With regard to Professor Redish's book itself, I was familiar with
Professor Redish's extensive scholarly activity and knew that the book
would be a high quality work, which indeed it is. The book consists of
twelve essays dealing with "the leading areas of federal jurisdiction
where tensions have been most acute."'4 Each essay is well written and
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University. A.B., University of Pennsylvania, 1967; J.D.,
Harvard University, 1970.
** Professor of Law, Wayne State University, A.B., 1956; J.D., 1959, University of Pittsburgh.
1 Thus, I cannot claim "intimate familiarity" with all of the subjects covered in the book.
However, I have at least "passing familiarity" with all of them, and a great deal of interest in some
of them.
2 As a result of that involvement, I have analyzed certain constitutional questions "from
without and within"--as an academician who has been an attorney in litigation dealing with those
questions. See, e.g., Sedler, The Summary Contempt Power and the Constitution: The Vewfrom
Wi2tthout and Wi-thin, 51 N.Y.U.L. REV. 34 (1976); Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregationin the Wake
of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars: The View Largelyfrom Within,
1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535; Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The Fiewfrom Without
and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1; Sedler, he Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weaponfor
Social Change: Rqflectionsfrom Without and Within, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 237, 269 (1970).
3
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4 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 1.
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extremely well researched; the presentations are balanced and thorough. Professor Redish carefully dissects and analyzes all of the major
cases in each area, and presents the different points of view on each
subject, including those with which he disagrees. As a result the book
is truly a compendium of Federal Jurisdiction scholarship.
Throughout the book, Professor Redish sets forth his own views
very carefully and precisely, marshalling impressive arguments in their
support as he develops the thesis that the federal courts should be the
"primary adjudicators of federal law." At the same time, however, he
is very sensitive to the legitimate interests of the states and of the state
courts. As he concludes:
If an appropriate resolution of the tensions of judicial federalism is to be
achieved, a careful examination of specific state interests and the practical
effect the exercise of federal judicial authority might have on each must
be undertaken. Once these interests have been described, it will be necessary to determine the means for assuring their preservation that will provide the widest possible latitude
5 for the federal courts to perform their
role within the federal system.
This proposition is developed very effectively in Professor Redish's
book.
Although the book is very good overall, I do have two criticisms,
one "substantive" and one "structural." Substantively, I am somewhat
surprised that Professor Redish did not include a chapter on federal
court habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions. This is
an area with the potential for acute tensions between the federal courts
and the state courts, since here the federal court is in effect acting to
"reverse" state court decisions in criminal cases. It would have been
interesting to have the benefit of Professor Redish's views as to the
existence and resolution of tensions in this area.
My "structurar' criticism goes to Professor Redish's failure to include an "overview" chapter and to "tie things together" explicitly.
Professor Redish states that the chapters are "linked with one another
on a broader level."'6 However, while the book develops the themes
that the federal courts should be the "primary adjudicators of federal
law," and that there is a need for a sensitive balancing of legitimate
federal and state interests, the linkage between the chapters is somewhat unclear and may be obscured by the discussion of the specific
problems contained in each chapter. The lack of an "overview" chapter is thus a shortcoming of the book.
In my opinion, the "overview" chapter should have been directed
to an analysis of the sign@fcance of the tensions that result from the
allocation of judicial power in our federal system. It is this analysis
that I will now undertake, relying in large part on the discussion and
5 Id. at 4.
6
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presentations contained in each of the chapters in Professor Redish's
book. My overall conclusion, with which Professor Redish would
probably disagree, is that these tensions are not significant and that
there are not serious problems of judicial federalism resulting from the
allocation of judicial power in our federal system.
First, the fact that federal courts and state courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to hear cases involving federal challenges to the validity of
state laws or governmental action follows from the constitutional structure and the respective roles of federal and state courts in that structure.
Federal courts have the responsibility to invalidate unconstitutional
state laws and governmental action when exercising the judicial power
of the United States under Article III. 7 State courts have the same responsibility under the Supremacy Clause." The concurrent jurisdiction
of federal and state courts in this regard is designed to serve the same
objective: the supremacy of the federal constitution and federal law
over inconsistent state law. From the standpoint of constitutional
structure, then, the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction in cases involving
federal challenges to state laws or governmental action is a cooperative
venture designed to maintain federal supremacy. As such it should not
produce "tensions." 9
Second, because I have had substantial involvement as an attorney
in constitutional litigation in the federal courts, I operate on the "working assumption" that for the most part federal constitutional rights can
be effectively vindicated in federal courts and that challenges to the
validity of state laws and governmental action can be brought in federal courts rather than in state courts. The federal courts are where
attorneys want to bring federal challenges,10 and they assume, quite
correctly, that limitations on the power of the federal courts to entertain
the challenge are "exceptional." I have therefore approached my review of the book with the hypothesis that federal courts not only should
be, but in fact are, the "primary adjudicators of federal law."
Third, as a teacher of Conflict of Laws, I am interested in the fact
that state and federal courts are parallel and independent judicial systems, much in the same manner as the court systems of different states
are parallel and independent judicial systems in relation to each
other. Just as federal courts sometimes apply state law, as in diversity
7 Congress has authorized the full exercise of federal judicial power in this regard. 28 U.S.C.

§ 1343(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. I1 1979).
8 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2. See M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 124.
9 "Tensions" will arise only if one judicial system is not as disposed as the other to perform
its constitutionally mandated role. See notes 13-17 and accompanying text infra.
10 This was as true when attorneys for corporate interests were challenging state economic
regulation, see, e.g., Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), as it is at the present time when most of
the challenges are to state laws interfering with individual freedom.
11 The federal court system and the court system of each state are all considered "states" for
conflicts purposes. A state is defined for conflicts purposes as a geographic portion of the earth's
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cases, and state courts sometimes apply federal law, as in FELA and
other "federal claim" cases,12 courts of one state sometimes apply the
law of another state in a conflicts case. Conflicts thus exist between the
potential or actual exercise of jurisdiction by different state courts, just
as there are conflicts between the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts
and federal courts. The "tensions" in these contexts are "tensions" that
arise because of the existence of parallel and independent judicial systems, and when they arise between the federal and state courts, they do
not necessarily implicate "judicial federalism."
Accordingly, I assert the following propositions: (1) The federal
courts are, in fact, the "primary adjudicators of federal law." (2) The
tensions in the allocation of judicial power between federal and state
courts arise primarily because of the existence of parallel and independent judicial systems with overlapping jurisdiction and do not
present serious federalism problems. (3) The legitimate interests of the
states and of the state courts are fairly well protected from improper
federal judicial interference. In sum, I submit that "an appropriate resolution of the tensions of judicial federalism" for the most part does
exist in our federal system.
First, I submit that the federal courts are in fact the "primary adjudicators of federal law." The effect of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, is to give the
federal courts original jurisdiction in all cases involving federally based
challenges to "action taken under color of state law." Existing limitations on the federal courts' exercise of their jurisdiction in such cases do
not significantly impair their ability to determine the constitutionality
of state laws or governmental action and, given a choice, litigants will
almost invariably choose the federal forum to vindicate their federal
rights.
Professor Redish notes that under traditionally accepted notions of
federalism, state and federal courts "have been considered largely fungible," and that, "[e]xcept in the comparatively rare instance where
Congress has explicitly or by implication provided that jurisdiction is
exclusively federal, state courts historically stand equal with their federal counterparts as enforcers of federal rights." 13 Yet he is critical of
this notion of "parity," emphasizing that the enactment of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 indicated Congress' rejection of the "fungibility of state and fedsurface having an independent system of law. R. CRAMTON & R. SEDLER, THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1100 (1977).
12 The reference here is to cases in which state courts hear suits brought by private litigants
and based on federal law. As to the obligation of the state courts to hear such suits, see M.
REDISH, supra note 3, at 124-38. In certain circumstances state courts are also obligated, as a
matter of full faith and credit, to hear suits presenting claims under the law of a sister state. R.
CRAMTON & R. SEDLER, supra note 11, § 13.2100.
13 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 116. The fact that federal constitutional rights can be vindicated in state courts has been relied upon to sustain the power of Congress to remove such cases
from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. Id. at 25-26.
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eral courts for the adjudication of federal rights."' 4 As he states:
The position taken here is that the history of post-Civil War judicial
federalism dictates that federal courts be presumed the more expert and
able judicial system to protect federal rights.
Such a presumption appears consistent with the goals of modem federalism. It seems intuitively appropriate to providefederal courts the primary responsibility for adjudicatingfederal law, and leave as the primary
function of state courts the defining and expounding of state policies and
principles. State courts still retain an important role within the federal
judicial system and, as a constitutional matter, provide a technically adequate forum for the adjudication of federal law. But any conclusions concerning the allocation of federal judicial power based on the
interchangeable nature of state and federal courts as interpreters of federal law should be rejected.' 5
To support his position, Professor Redish reviews at length 16 all the
reasons why federal judges are, as has been observed, "more enlightto proened concerning, more tolerant toward, and more courageous
17
tect, federal rights than are their state counterparts."'
It is precisely because federal courts are more likely to vindicate
federal rights than state courts, that a litigant, given a choice of forum,
will almost invariably choose the federal forum. Consequently, federal
courts will inpractice be the "primary adjudicators of federal law" unless there are significant limitations on federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction to protect federal rights and to determine the constitutionality
of state law and governmental action. Such limitations, however,
clearly do not exist.
The operative jurisdictional principle that insures the primacy of
federal courts in questions of federal law is that a plaintiff raising a
federal challenge to a state law or governmental action is ordinarily
entitled to raise that challenge in a federal forum. Federal courts do
not "abstain" to give state courts the first opportunity to pass on a federal challenge,' 8 and a federal plaintiff is not required to "exhaust"
state judicial remedies. 19 In an unbroken line of cases, even antedating
Ex Parte Young, 20 the Supreme Court has adhered to this fundamental
14
15
16
17

Id. at 2.
Id. at 3 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 2-3.
Amsterdam, CriminalProsecutionsAffecting Federally GuaranteedCivil Rights: FederalRemoval and HabeasCorpus Jurisdictionto Abort State CriminalTrial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 837
n.186 (1965). See also Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social
Change: Refectionsfrom Without and Within, 18 U. KAN. L. REv. 237, 254-55 (1970).

18 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254-55 (1967).
19 This proposition, first enunciated in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), has been
reaffirmed many times. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 477 (1973).
20 209 U.S. 123 (1908). In that case the Court held that the eleventh amendment did not

prevent suits challenging the constitutionality of state laws or governmental action in the federal
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principle,21 which flows from 42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the Supreme Court
has stated, "[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's
federal rights-to protect the people from unconstitutional action
under color of state law, 'whether that action be executive, legislative or
judicial.' "22 Since Congress has "imposed the duty upon all levels of
the federal judiciary to give due respect to a suitor's choice of a federal
forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional
claims, ' 2 the primacy of the federal courts in questions of federal law
is structurally built into the allocation of judicial power between federal and state courts. The circumstances in which federal courts are
ousted of jurisdiction in cases presenting questions of federal law are
limited; the situations where a federal court will not be able to resolve a
constitutional challenge to the validity of a state law or governmental
action are similarly few in number.
The major limitation on federal courts' exercise of jurisdiction
over cases presenting questions of federal law is that imposed by the
Younger doctrine. 24 Under that doctrine, federal courts may not interfere in pending state court criminal proceedings-and, in all likelihood,
in pending state court civil proceedings 25-in the absence of "exceptional circumstances. ' 26 I have explained the Younger doctrine primarily in terms of remedies:27 the federal "equity court" 28 cannot grant
courts so long as the suit was against a state officer rather than the state itself. Id. at 167-68. See
M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 154-57.
21 See Wechsler, FederalCourts State CriminalLaw and the FirstAmendment, 49 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 740, 753-63 (1974).
22 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346
(1879)). Professor Redish argues that the legislative history of § 1983, relied on by the Court in
Mitchum, "reflect[s] strong congressional distrust of the motives and competence of state courts,"

and thus counsels rejection of the notion of "parity" between federal and state courts with respect
to the protection of federal rights. M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 274.
23 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967). As the Court also noted: "Plainly, escape
from that duty is not permissible merely because state courts also have the solemn responsibility,
equally with the federal courts. . . 'to guard, enforce and protect every right granted or secured
Id. (quoting Robb v. Connally, 111 UI.S. 624,
by the Constitution of the United States ....
637 (1884)).
24 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Professor Redish refers to the Younger doctrine as
"Our Federalism." M. RaDISH, supra note 3, ch. 11.
25 Although the Supreme Court has not yet held that the Younger doctrine applies to all pending state court civil proceedings, a number of federal circuits have so held, and in all of the cases
coming before the Supreme Court, the Court has held the Younger doctrine applicable in the
particular case. See M. REDisH, supra note 3, at 315-21; Sedler, Younger and Its Progeny: .4
Variation on the Theme of Equity, Comity and Federalism, 9 U. TOL. L. Rav. 681, 705-15 (1978).
26 As to "exceptional circumstances," see Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The
Viewfrom Witthout and Within, 1972 Wis. L. REv. 1, 29-44.

Professor Redish, in contrast, has explained it primarily in terms of federalism, M. REDISH,
supra note 3, at 298-303, as have all the other commentators. See authorities cited in Sedler, supra
note 25, at 681 n.2.
28 For discussion of the position of the federal court as an "equity court" in relation to the
state "law court" in this situation, see Sedler, supra note 25, at 683-86.
27

546
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relief with respect to a pending state court proceeding, because in the
absence of "special circumstances," the federal "equity" plaintiff has an
court proceedadequate remedy by way of defense to the pending state
'29
ing and therefore has no need for "equitable relief."
The Younger doctrine does not apply where there is no pending
state court proceeding and the federal plaintiff is seeking relief against
the threatened enforcement of state law. 30 Nor does the doctrine prevent federal courts from issuing preliminary injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings. 31 What this means is that
federalism considerations do not preclude federal court interference
with state criminal law enforcement so long as remedies considerations
do not militate against the granting of relief by the federal "equity
court."' 32 It seems to me,33 as it does to Professor Redish, 34 that the
matter of federal court interference with state criminal law enforcement
should not depend on remedies considerations, and that the federal
courts should have the affirmative responsibility to protect federal
rights despite the existence of an "adequate remedy" in the state courts.
But federal habeas corpus review of most state court criminal convictions is available, so that ultimately a federal court will pass on the
constitutionality of the underlying state law35 and on most of the other
federal questions presented in the prosecution. 36 With respect to state
criminal law enforcement, the Younger doctrine does not seriously undercut37the role of federal courts as the "primary adjudicators of federal
law."
If applied to prevent federal court interference with state court
civil proceedings, 38 the Younger doctrine would mean that some litigants will be unable to have their federal claim litigated in a federal
court, as would the possible application of collateral estoppel involving
29 Id. at 685-88.

30 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974). I explain Steffel in remedies terms, Sedler,

supra note 25, at 700-05, while Professor Redish explains it primarily in federalism terms. M.
REDISH, supra note 3, at 307-09.

31 Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975).
32 Sedler, supra note 25, at 703-05.
33 Id. at 725-27.
34 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 398-407.
35 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
36 Federal habeas corpus review is generally not available in illegal search and seizure claims,
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976), and may be barred by the defendant's failure to raise
the federal claim in accordance with specified state procedures. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.

536, 540-41 (1976).
37 Even when federal habeas corpus review is not available, review is at least potentially available in the Supreme Court. If a case presents a sufficiently important question of federal law, the
Supreme Court is likely to grant review.
38 See note 25 supra.
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issues litigated in a state court 39 in a subsequent federal court proceeding. But the number of cases in which this will occur is likely to be very
small.4° In the final analysis then, the Younger doctrine does not impair significantly the federal courts' role as the "primary adjudicators
of federal law."
Another limitation on the exercise of federal jurisdiction in challenges to the validity of state law or governmental action is the abstention doctrine. This doctrine, however, does not impair the role of
federal courts as the "primary adjudicators of federal law" because, as
pointed out previously, 4 1 federal courts do not "abstain" in order to
give state courts the opportunity to pass on federal challenges to state
law or governmental action. As Professor Redish notes, the feature
"shared by most forms of federal abstention is the presence of an uncertain or ambiguous question of state law."4 2 The most frequent application of abstention is the "Pullman" variety, under which the
exercise of federal jurisdiction is not relinquished, but is merely postponed pending determination of the state law question by the state
court. 43 "Pullman" abstention is proper only when the state court's resolution of an uncertain or ambiguous issue of state law may avoid or
modify the federal constitutional question. 44 Following the state
court's decision on the state law question, the federal plaintiff may return to the federal court for the adjudication of the federal constitutional claim.45 Hence, "Pullman" abstention supports the proposition
that, while the state courts must determine issues of state law, 46 the
federal courts are the "primary adjudicators of federal law."' 47 The
39 See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Where, however, a federal plaintiff seeks prospective relief against the enforcement of a state law, challenged as unconstitutional, the fact that
the constitutional claim could have been raised in a prior state court criminal proceeding under
that law is no bar. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 711 (1977). In my opinion, the result
should not differ even if the federal constitutional claim actually was asserted in the prior state
court proceeding. See Sedler, supra note 25, at 721-22.
40 Moreover, I should add that if a party wishes to repeat conduct punished in a completed
state court proceeding, that party can bring an affirmative federal court action to prevent future
prosecutions. See Sedler, supra note 25, at 719-22.
41 See notes 18-23 and accompanying text supra.
42 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 233 (emphasis added).
43 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See M. REDISH, supra note 3, at
233-35.
44 See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1967); M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 236-39.
45 See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417 (1964); M.
REDISH, supra note 3, at 255-57.
46 Professor Redish notes that "[tlhe logic of Pullman abstention, then, is that it is wiser to
obtain a definitive construction of the state law from the state courts prior to the federal court's
decision on constitutional questions." M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 235.
47 Professor Redish says that "the primary goal of Pullman abstention [is] the avoidance of a
constitutional confrontation with the state." Id. But the constitutional confrontation in this context is avoided only if the state "retreats" by resolving the state law issue in such a way that the
federal plaintiff prevails on the merits and thus does not need to assert the federal constitutional
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other varieties of abstention involve situations where no federal constieven no question of federal law-is
tutional question-sometimes
48
presented.
Similarly, the anti-injunction act 49 does not interfere with the abil-

ity of the federal courts to protect federal rights from improper state
governmental action, since it does not apply to causes brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.50 Its only effect on the role of federal courts as the "pri-

mary adjudicators of federal law" is to prevent federal court interference with state court proceedings in some "federal claim" situations
where both federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction.5 ' Yet

where the state court and the federal court have concurrent jurisdiction
over the same "federal claim" case, it is difficult to see how considera-

tions of "judicial federalism" are in any way implicated. In this situation, federal and state courts are in the same position as the courts of
different states with potential jurisdiction over the same case. The re-

quirements of federal supremacy generally preclude the state courts
from interfering with the jurisdiction of the federal courts; 52 and the
anti-injunction act is the statutorily imposed reciprocal counterpart
53
designed to protect the jurisdiction of the state court in a proper case.
There are thus relatively few limitations on federal courts' exercise

of jurisdiction to determine federal challenges to state laws or governmental action, or to determine questions of federal law generally.
Since litigants, given a choice of forum, will almost invariably choose a
federal forum to vindicate their federal rights, federal courts are infact
the "primary adjudicators of federal law."

We may now consider the limitations imposed on federal judicial
power in order to protect legitimate state interests. As Professor Redish
notes, "occasions will arise when the need for federal court adjudica-

tion must give rise to the overriding interest in preserving cooperative
claim. It seems to me, therefore, that the primary basis of Pullman abstention is the policy of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional adjudication rather than the avoidance of a constitutional
confrontation with the state. Similarly, Professor Redish explains the "adequate state ground"
limitation on Supreme Court review of state court decisions as embodying the policy that "the

Supreme Court should avoid unnecessary pronouncements of federal law, particularly when friction with state courts or state substantive policies may result." Id. at 217. Again, I believe that the
policy behind the "adequate state ground" limitation, like the policy behind "Pullman" abstention, is to "avoid unnecessary pronouncements of federal law." A strong argument can also be
made that the "adequate state ground" limitation is mandated by Article III's case or controversy
requirement. See id.
48 See id. at 240-49.
49 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
50 Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972).
51 This is true, of course, in diversity cases as well.
52 See Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1964).
53 Professor Redish favors a broader interpretation of the "in aid of jurisdiction" exception.
He would allow federal courts to enjoin concurrent state court proceedings in cases where important issues of federal law are involved. M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 285-90.
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federalism. ' 54 Professor Redish emphasizes the need for a sensitive
balancing of state and federal interests as they appear in the context of
the exercise of federal judicial power. He is nevertheless critical of how
courts have struck the balance in a number of areas.
Professor Redish's criticism, however, cuts both ways. He disagrees with the Supreme Court's interpretation of the eleventh amendment as barring suits by in-state citizens against the state, but contends
that federal courts should recognize the state's sovereign immunity in
such cases unless Congress has affirmatively acted to abolish that immunity.55 He is also very critical of federal courts' creation of "federal
common law," displacing applicable state law, at least where the
United States is not a party or foreign relations policies are not involved.5 6 On the other hand, in the Erie 57 context his concern is for the
"cost-avoidance" interest of the federal courts; and he would replace
the modified outcome-determinative test of Hanna58 with a test that
varbalances the "cost-avoidance" interest of federal courts against5the
9
ious types of policies state procedures are designed to further.
I will not attempt to evaluate Professor Redish's criticisms of how
the balance between legitimate federal and state interests has been
struck in these areas, or delve deeply into his proposals for change. It
seems to me, however, that the "tensions" in these areas are simply not
that significant, and that on the whole there has been a fairly good level
of accommodation. Federal courts are not trammeling legitimate state
interests to any great degree, and at the same time are performing their
role as the "primary adjudicators of federal law."
I submit that any controversy over the proper scope of the eleventh
amendment is peripheral to concerns for "cooperative federalism."
The eleventh amendment, as presently interpreted, essentially precludes federal courts from awarding damages payable from the state
60
treasury for past constitutional or statutory violations by the state.
But even if the federal courts were not required to respect the state's
sovereign immunity in this regard, the award of damages against the
state for past constitutional or statutory violations would not significantly impair important state policies. It would increase the costs of
state governmental operations by only a small amount in relation to
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 152.
56 See generallyid. ch. 4.
57 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
58 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
59 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 189-203.
60 The eleventh amendment does not prevent prospective relief that has fiscal consequences
for the state, nor does it prevent the award of damages against state officers or local governmental
bodies. In addition, Congress, in the exercise of its affirmative powers under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, can impose damages liability against the state for past violations of that amendment.
See id. at 153-59.
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state governmental expenditures as a whole.61 Any controversy over
the balance struck by the eleventh amendment
is therefore peripheral
'62
to concerns for "cooperative federalism.
By contrast, a very significant source of interference with legitimate state interests by the federal courts and/or Congress would be the
substitution of federal law for state law as the controlling substantive
law in private litigation. The ability of states to provide the rule of
decision in private actions is a major attribute of state sovereignty in
our federal system. 63 This sovereignty was seriously eroded by the application of "federal common law" in diversity cases prior to Erie, and
as Professor Redish notes, Erie represented a "dramatic
reversal in the
' 64
relation between the federal courts and state law.
However, once Erie recognized that federal courts could not displace state substantive law in diversity cases, hammering out the precise contours of the Erie doctrine has had no serious implications for
"cooperative federalism," since the process relates only to deciding
which analytically "procedural" state rules must be applied by the federal courts in diversity cases. The relationship between the federal
court and the state court in a diversity case has always seemed to me to
be identical to the relationship between the forum court in a conflicts
case, once it has decided to displace its own law,65 and the state whose
substantive law it has decided to apply for the rule of decision in the
case. 66 Once the forum has chosen to displace its own law, it has necessarily concluded that it has no interest in the substantive outcome of
the case; its interest is limited to controlling the conduct of the litigation
before it.67 The forum court should therefore apply all the legal rules
of the other state, whether analytically "substantive" or "procedural,"
that will materially affect the outcome of the litigation, except where
61 On the other side of the equation, once the eleventh amendment was interpreted as not
precluding federal court adjudication of the validity of state laws or governmental action, it could
not interfere with the ability of the federal courts to perform their role as the "primary adjudicators of federal law." See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 15458.
62 The interests implicated by the eleventh amendment are those of private persons who seek
to recover damages from the state treasury, and that of the state in being able to avoid the payment of such damages.
63 An independent system of substantive law determines the existence of a state for conflicts
purposes. See note 11 supra.
64 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 169.
65 In the Erie context, the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), requires the federal
court to displace its substantive law, and directs the federal court to the substantive law of the state
in which it sits, including that state's conflicts law.
66 See Sedler, The Erie Outcome Test as a Guide to Substance andProcedurein the Conflict of
Laws, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 813, 821-22 (1962).
67 Id. at 822-24. This interest is a substantial one, and can be advanced by the forum, consistent with the requirements of full faith and credit. See Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514, 516-17 (1953).
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doing so will violate the forum's strong procedural policy or interfere

with the efficient operation of the forum's judicial system. 68 Both the

Hanna modified outcome test and Professor Redish's refined balancing
test 69 achieve this objective. Whichever test is adopted is of no moment
for "cooperative federalism."
The ability of the states to prescribe the controlling substantive law
in private litigation could also be eroded by frequent creation of "federal common law" by federal courts in nondiversity cases. While Professor Redish is critical of the creation of "federal common law," he
notes that "[t]he most extensive development of federal common law
has come in cases which directly implicate the interests of the United
States government. '70 He does not appear to dispute the propriety of a
controlling federal law in these cases or in cases involving foreign relations. 7' His major criticism is of the federal courts' development of a
"federal common law" of admiralty. 72 But even if this criticism is well
founded, it is still state law, not federal law, that is controlling in the
overwhelming majority of cases between private litigants. 73 This vital
aspect of state sovereignty thus is not seriously impaired by the creation
of "federal common law" by federal courts.
Federal habeas corpus review of state court criminal convictions
would seemingly raise most directly the question of whether "the need
for federal court adjudication must give rise to the interest in cooperative federalism." 74 As stated previously, it would have been interesting
to have the benefit of Professor Redish's views in this regard. In this
area, however, both the Supreme Court75 and Congress76 have made a
studied effort to accommodate the legitimate interests of the states
while preserving the role of the federal courts as the "primary adjudicators of federal law."' 77 This result has been accomplished by requiring
that state court remedies be exhausted as a precondition to federal
habeas corpus review, by giving certain deference to the findings of the
state courts, 78 and by simultaneously reserving ultimate review of fed68 I relied on the Erie "outcome-determinative" test of Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99 (1945), as modifed by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), to
formulate this test for conflicts purposes. Sedler, supra note 66, at 824-25.
69 M. REDISH, supra note 3, at 98-202.
70 Id. at 85.
71 Id. at 85-93, 97.
72 Id. at 97-105.
73 For a discussion of "federal common law" in suits between state entities in the context of
interstate pollution, see id. at 105-07.
74 Id. at 3.
75 See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
76 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).

77 More precisely, an effort has been made to preserve their role in saying whether there has
been a violation of federal constitutional rights in the state criminal prosecution.
78 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e) (1976).
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eral constitutional claims for the federal courts.79
The true effect of this scheme of review is indeed an exercise in

"cooperative federalism." Since both federal courts and state courts

have the constitutionally mandated responsibility to protect federal

rights, 80 the redundancy of both federal and state court review "fosters

greater certainty that constitutional rights will not be erroneously denied." 81 Commentators have also suggested that federal habeas corpus
review of state court criminal convictions creates a dialectic between
federal and state courts designed to "translat[e] those values which the

[Supreme] Court has identified as significant into specific constitutional

rights. 8 2z In any event, the requirement that the accused exhaust state
83
remedies, while perhaps having certain undesirable consequences,
does serve to minimize the "tensions" between the federal and state
courts, enabling both court systems to engage in the cooperative venture of protecting the federal constitutional rights of state criminal defendants.

My conclusion, therefore, is that the tensions resulting in the allocation ofjudicial power between federal and state courts are not significant, and that there are not serious problems of judicial federalism
resulting from the allocation of judicial power in our federal system.
Federal courts are in fact, the "primary adjudicators of federal law,"
yet the legitimate interests of the states and state courts are fairly well
protected from improper federal judicial interference. In the final analysis, both the federal courts and the state courts succeed in performing

their respective and sometimes overlapping functions in our constitutional scheme.

79 As the Supreme Court has stated:
The exhaustion-of-state remedies doctrine, now codified in the federal habeas corpus statute,
reflects a policy of federal-state comity, "an accommodation of our federal system designed to
give the State the initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." We have consistently adhered to this federal policy, for "it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court
conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation."
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Wilwording v. Swenson,
404 U.S. 249, 250 (1971) (per curiam) and Darr v. Buford, 339 U.S. 200, 204 (1950)).
For a discussion of circumstances where federal constitutional claims cannot be raised in
habeas corpus review of state criminal convictions, see note 36 supra.
80 As the Supreme Court noted in Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886), the purpose of
the exhaustion doctrine is to prevent "unnecessary conflict between courts equally bound to guard
and protect rights secured by the Constitution."
81 Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalisnr Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035, 1045 (1977).
82 Id. at 1047.
83 These undesirable consequences arise both from the standpoint of the defendant in obtaining his release, and from the standpoint of the state in providing "finality" to criminal convictions.

